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i. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to evaluate the role of the World Bank 
in Sub-Saharan Africa's development. It argues that the 
World Bank has stepped beyond the boundaries of a typical 
lending institution by 
The study argues that 
linking its aid to political reform. 
in this capacity the Bank has 
contributed to the halting democratization process currently 
underway in Africa. 
The economic effects of the World Bank's Structural 
Adjustment Programmes have been less successful. As yet, 
the programmes have not produced the expected results and 
there is no evidence of long-term, sustainable economic 
recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa . These programmes are, 
however, long-term strategies and it may therefore be too 
premature to reach a final conclusion. They may also have 
been affected negatively by unfavourable political 
environments. 
This study, noting the negative effects of the international 
terms of trade and prices for African exports, concludes that 
although economic recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa will be 
facilitated by domestic political and economic policy reform, 
there is also a need for reform of the international economic 
order. The World Bank has correctly identified the need for 
domestic improvement, but it has a tendency to disregard the 
negative consequences of the existing structure of the 
international economy. 
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Chapter One 
THE POLITICAL NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT 
It is a given fact that the world is divided between rich and 
poor states. It is customary to make this distinction 
through the use of the concepts of 'developed' and 'less 
developed' nations. In comparison to the developed advanced 
industrialized nations, less developed countries have a very 
low level of socio-economic development which is reflected by 
their generally lower standard of living and quality of life. 
Bannock et al (1987.111) describe a developing country as: 
"A country that has not yet reached the stage of 
economic development characterized by the growth of 
industrialization, nor a level of national income 
sufficient to yield the domestic savings required to 
finance the investment necessary for further growth". 
This definition, whilst providing a satisfactory economic 
description of a developing country lacks a sensitivity to 
its political and social characteristics. Many developing 
countries are renowned, not only for their weak economic 
condition, but also for their poor governing ability and 
inadequate means of attending to social problems which are 
compounded by rapid population growth and high levels of 
unemployment. This means that the problems faced by 
developing countries go beyond pure economics tG include 
political and social issues too. 
David Goldsworthy's definition (1988.507) is more adequate to 
2. 
the extent that it provides an all-encompassing description 
of development which exhibits an acute awareness of its 
multifaceted nature : 
"Development is an idea which combines the moral with 
the material. It is a moral idea in that it is about 
human betterment, fulfilment, the enrichment of lives 
through the expansion of choice; and a material one in 
that it is about overcoming material poverty through the 
creation and optimal distribution of wealth". 
Simply translated, this means that development is not only an 
economic issue whereby the only pressing issue is the 
reconstruction of the economy. As Goldsworthy suggests, 
development is a moral and material concept related to 
improving the quality of human life by ensuring the optimal 
distribution of wealth. But, policies and activities 
designed to facilitate and encourage development do not 
guarantee that the needs of all parties will be met: 
" ... there is little or no likelihood of positive-sum 
outcomes with gains to all participants. Development in 
practice is not just about deciding what courses of 
action will bring benefits to which groups; it is about 
choosing which objectives to pursue at the expense of 
which others" (Goldsworthy:1988 . 508). 
Goldsworthy's argument, therefore, is that the nature and 
consequences of development plans are essentially political 
in that they necessarily involve trade-offs between various 
sectors of the society . He correctly maintains that the 
facts of loss and gain make development " ... an intrinsically 
and intensely political subject" (ibid) because they point 
directly at considerations of values, interests and power. 
Goldsworthy's essential point, therefore, is that these 
phenomena determine attitudes to development, patterns of 
development, strategies for 
implementation. 
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development and their 
This is exemplified by the fact that empirical research has 
shown that rich-poor differentials tend to reflect the nature 
of power distribution and not the pattern of human need. 
This occurs because the values and interests of wealthy 
power-holders easily differ from those with lower levels of 
income and less power. Thus, a development policy which 
might result in a radical redistribution of wealth, and hence 
antagonize powerful beneficiaries of the current allocation 
pattern, might not be introduced or implemented in the way in 
which its creators intended. Likewise, the values and 
interests of the creators might not reflect a sensitivity to 
the basic needs of those at whom their strategy is supposedly 
targeted. 
This can be narrowed down into a conflict between the values 
and interests of those who have power and those who do not. 
This conflict manifests itself at a political level and has a 
significant effect on development strategies world-wide. Its 
significance for development strategies is that it highlights 
the extent to which the values and interests of those with 
economic and political power, both at the international and 
national level, determine the type of strategy which they 
believe will bring about an improvement in the quality of 
life and the redistribution of wealth. 
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The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
more commonly known as the World 
known architects of development 
Bank, is one of the better-
strategies, espec i ally in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Being a powerful international economic 
and political development institution, and given the above 
line of argument, its development strategies and policies 
inevitably reflect its particular values and interests . The 
relevant question is whether or not its strategies in Sub-
Saharan Africa are sensitive to the values and interests of 
the politically and economically unendowed at whom they are 
aimed . Furthermore, it is necessary to ascertain the extent 
to which its policies threaten political and economic status 
quos, and the extent to which the powerful sectors of each 
society seek to obstruct and hinder their implementation. An 
analysis in this direction hinges directly on the political 
aspects of development . 
In addition to the intrinsically political nature of 
development there is the issue 
strategies designed to alleviate 
of the nature of the 
the problems of developing 
nations. For the most part, these strategies have tended to 
concentrate specifically on alleviating the economic 
deficiencies of developing countries, paying less attention 
to political issues and weak governments, than they have to 
the effects of, and remedies for, poorly conceived economic 
policies. Recently, however, the emphasis has shifted . 
There is a growing tendency for development strategists to 
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envisage political correction as a prerequisite for 
successful economic development. The implication is that 
they are finding fault with the manner in which the values 
and interests of those in power are determining the course of 
economic development. 
Traditionally, the paradigm used to analyse development 
strategies has been the 'internal' versus 'external' causes 
debate between radical critics, like Onimode (1989) who argue 
that the development crisis is the result of the hostile 
international political economy and liberal critics, like the 
world Bank, who maintain that bad government and misguided 
policy choices are at fault. Whilst this paradigm continues 
to hold some relevance to development strategies, there is a 
shift weighted in favour of the 'internal' causes and 
solutions. Left-wing critics are beginning to, and right-
wing critics are continuing to, place more emphasis on the 
role of constructive political reform in providing the 
environment in which the quality of life can improve and 
sustainable and equitable growth can occur. In other words, 
there seems to be a consensus on the destructiveness of the 
prevailing values and interests of the empowered in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
The following extract summarises the essence of this 
assertion: 
"In recent years, international experts who analyse the 
economies of developing countries have concluded that 
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the persistent poverty and sluggish-to-nonexistent 
economic growth that afflict [these countries] are due 
less to the scarcity of capital investment and suitable 
technology than to ill-chosen policies" (de Soto & 
orsini:1991 . 107). 
Thus, although development strategies continue to focus on 
the need to reform the economic policies of the afflicted 
countries, there is also an increased tendency towards seeing 
better governance as the primary requirement for economic 
recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ake:1991.36). The World Bank 
is one of the main advocates of this tendency as is clearly 
exhibited by the fact that its programme loans to African 
countries are provided on the condition that governments 
undertake to embark upon a programme of political reform. 
Indeed, "political accountability" is fast becoming the 
latest catch-word in development rhetoric and strategies with 
the intention being to restructure Sub-Saharan African 
politics along democratic principles. It appears that 
strategists believe that such an occurrence will allow the 
values and interests of the poor to prevail more than they do 
under current circumstances. 
Whether or not the implementation of democratic principles 
will ensure more equitable development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
remains to be seen. It is obvious, however, that whilst the 
World Bank seeks to rectify the problems it perceives to have 
been brought about by corrupt, elitist African governments, 
that it intends replacing their values and interests with 
some of its own. The issue is whether or not these are 
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relevant and suitable to the African environment and its 
current circumstances. 
This discussion has sought to define the role of politics in 
development. It has argued that development issues are 
intrinsically political by virtue of the fact that strategies 
to alleviate poverty and discrepancies in wealth distribution 
inevitably threaten the interests and values of different 
sectors of the society in question, particularly those with 
political and economic power. It has also argued that there 
is a recent tendency for development strategies to place a 
greater emphasis on the need for political reform to precede 
economic development. It has been suggested that this is due 
to the fact that development strategists, such as the World 
Bank, perceive the current values and interests of the 
governments in Sub-Saharan Africa to be a major cause of the 
economic decline in the continent. It has also been noted, 
by virtue of the nature of its development strategies, that 
the World Bank is in turn seeking to imprint its values and 
interests on Sub-Saharan African society, believing that 
these will go a long way in alleviating the crisis. 
I will proceed with 
discussing the origins 
background. This will 
values, which in turn 
interests. This will 
the analysis by identifying and 
of the World Bank's ideological 
explain its economic and political 
aid identification of its prevailing 
create a paradigm from which 
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constructive criticism of its development strategies and 
approach to Sub-Saharan African development can be made. 
Chapter Two 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The international political economy is the pivotal point of 
discussions concerning development because it is the 
established context within which international and domestic 
political and economic transactions occur. Essentially, 
international political economy refers to the reciprocal 
relationship between international politics and economics. 
Robert Gilpin (1975.21/2) writes: 
" ... politics largely determines the framework of 
econom~c activity and channels it in directions intended 
to serve the interests of dominant groups; the exercise 
of power in all its forms is a major determinant of the 
nature of an economic system ... the economic process 
itself tends to redistribute power and wealth; it 
transforms the power relationships among groups. This 
in turn leads to a transformation of the political 
system, thereby giving rise to a new structure of 
economic relationships". 
This extract supports the previous assertions concerning the 
role of power, interests and values in determining the 
pattern of economic development and distribution . Like 
Goldsworthy (ibid), Gilpin stresses the centrality of power, 
values and interests in political and economic issues, 
arguing that those in power determine the economic policies 
and that those with economic wealth have the means to 
transform the political system and hence, restructure and 
reform economic policies. 
Besides noting the influence that politics has on economic 
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issues, Gilpin accentuates the 
existing between these dynamics 
reciprocal relationship 
arguing that their 
relationship " ... translates into that between wealth 
at 
and 
the power" (1975.22). This relationship exists 
international and the domestic level. The former accounts 
for the " ... interrelationships between economic transactions 
and international politics" (Blake & Walters:1987.3) , whilst 
the latter accounts for the same at the domestic or national 
level. The relationship between the World Bank and the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa is at the international 
level whilst that between governments and their citizens is 
at the national level. 
To determine the nature of the values, interests and power of 
the World Bank it is essential that a conceptual framework is 
formed, from which relations between the World Bank and Sub-
Saharan African countries 
discussing the creation 
may 
of the 
be evaluated. (This includes 
1944). Having covered these 
economic dynamics of their 
Bank at Bretton Woods in 
aspects, the political and 
relationship and the effect that 
it has on 
evaluated. 
Sub-Saharan development strategies can be 
The different theories pertaining to the nature of the 
international political economy will be discussed. After 
determining which theory best explains the values and the 
interests of the World Bank, the discussion will endeavour to 
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relate this to the Bank's origins in order to explain its 
power, and the way it deals with the issue of poverty and 
underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
There are three main perspectives on international political 
economy: liberal, Marxist, and realist or nationalist. All 
three are mutually exclusive and, as Frieden and Lake 
(1987.5) note: 
"The assumptions upon which each of these three 
perspectives is based lead international political 
economists to view the world in very different ways. 
Many liberals regard foreign direct investment in less 
developed countries, for instance, as a mutually 
rewarding exchange between entrepreneurs. Many 
Marxists, on the other hand, see the foreign firm as 
exploiting the less developed country". 
Whilst these theories go a long way in facilitating 
discussion and understanding, it must be stressed that they 
do not adequately account for the nature of the relationships 
within the international political economy. They are merely 
'ideal types' which are useful in explaining some observed 
phenomena. 
Before beginning with the premises of the three perspectives, 
the following extract from Gilpin (1987.25) brings to one's 
attention the impact that these various ideologies, which 
reflect differing values and interests, have on development 
strategies. He writes: 
"The three ideologies differ on a broad range of 
questions such as: What is the significance of the 
market for economic growth and the distribution of 
wealth among groups and societies? What ought to be the 
role of markets in the organization of domestic and 
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international society?" 
Essentially, this means that each ideology reflects a 
different set of values and interests and it is these which 
determine the assumptions of each theory. Many national 
political-economic dispensations are based on one or more of 
these theories. The consequences of having these values and 
interests will become increasingly apparent as the three 
theories are discussed. 
Liberal economic theory, which emerged from the writings of 
Adam smith and David Ricardo, is committed to free markets 
and minimal state intervention and acts on the assumption 
that politics and economics exist ideally in separate 
spheres. Frieden and Lake (1987.6) write that liberalism is 
based on three assumptions: firstly, that individuals are the 
principal actors within the political economy, secondly, that 
these individuals are " ... rational, utility-maximizing 
actors" and thirdly, that they " ... maximize utility by making 
trade-offs between goods". 
These assumptions point towards the most central tenet of 
liberal economic theory which is the efficiency of the market 
and the price mechanism. Given the fact that liberal 
economists believe in the centrality of a rational, utility-
maximizing individual, they argue that: 
"If markets are open and no impediments to trade exist, 
everyone can be made as well off as possible given 
existing stocks of goods and services. Everyone, in 
other words, will be at his or hers highest level of 
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utility" (Frieden & Lake:1987 . 6). 
Liberals therefore argue that the primary objective pursued 
by states should be the creation of a market system which 
will ensure maximum aggregate economic growth in national and 
global economies. To this end they strongly support the 
existence of free trade and open markets which they maintain 
will increase the range of goods and services available to 
, the consumer (Gilpin:1987.28). This means that all states 
must open themselves to foreign goods and capital and, 
specialize in the production of goods in which they possess a 
comparative advantage (Blake & Walters:1987.6). 
An important element of liberal theory is its basic 
assumption concerning economic gains between states. 
theory adopts a positive-sum approach to the issue 
Liberal 
of the 
distribution of economic gain accumulated under the 
principles of the liberal economic umbrella. By this, it is 
understood that there are mutual benefits in each interaction 
although they are not necessarily mutually identical (Blake & 
Walters:1987.6). Furthermore, under these conditions, 
liberal economic theory assumes that there is a minimum 
degree of, or need for, conflict in economic relations 
conducted at the international or domestic level (Frieden and 
Lake:1987.7). 
The nationalist or realist perspective on international 
political economy differs from the liberal economic theory in 
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that it assumes that n . .. economic activities are and should 
be subordinate to the goal of state buildi ng and the 
interests of the staten (Gi lpin:1987.31) . Thus, unlike the 
l i berals, nationalists consider the state, national security 
and military power as central elements in the organizing and 
functioning of the nation-state . Hence, the assumptions 
underlying the theory pertain to the centrality of the 
conflict between nation-states. They are firstly, that 
nation-states are the dominant actors in the international 
political economy, secondly, that they are power-maximizers 
and thirdly, that they are rational in the sense that, when 
confronted with an option, they will choose that which will 
maximize their power (Frieden and Lake . 1987.10). 
The implications of these assumptions are that nation states 
prefer to act in their own self interests rather than in the 
interests of global and domestic economic maximization. In 
other words, unlike the liberal perspective which argues for 
a necessary differentiation between politics and economics in 
the interests Of economic efficiency, nationalists argue that 
political issues overide and determine economic issues to the 
detriment of the maximization of global economic efficiency. 
This is because a nation state's greatest interest is self-
preservation. 
Economic nationalism must be seen as an essentially defensive 
approach to the realm of international political economy in 
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that it accounts for the tendency of state 'A' to seek to 
strengthen its economy at the expense of state 'B'. 
strengthening the national economy is seen as a means of 
acquiring wealth so as to consolidate national security and 
hence, 'A's position in the global economy. The soundness of 
this approach is its realistic analysis of the inherent 
conflict existing between different nation-states. It 
correctly identifies the tendency of states to put national 
interests above the altruistic goal of maximizing 
international economic efficiency, that is, the inclination 
towards seeing relative gain as more important than mutual 
gain (Gilpin:1987.33). 
The assumptions of the radical or Marxist perspective also 
differ considerably to those underlying the liberal and 
national theories . According to Frieden and Lake (1987.8/9) 
the three basic assumptions of radical theory are as follows: 
firstly, classes are the dominant actors in the political 
economy, secondly, these classes act in their material 
interests and thirdly, the basis of the capitalist economy is 
the exploitation of labour by capital. This implies that 
like nationalism, radical or Marxist theory is inherently 
conflictual and that there is no basic harmony of interests 
amongst the principle actors . 
Radicals perceive national self-determination and equitable 
income distribution to be just as crucial to economic issues 
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as the priorities of growth and economic efficiency (Blake & 
Walters:1987.8). This perception is shaped by their belief 
that the benefits of international economic relations are 
distributed unequally due to the uneven and unequal nature of 
the international political economy. Consequently, the 
radical analyst sees integration into the international 
political economy as incompatible with income equality and 
the capacity for economic and political self-determination . 
This is because, according to radical thought, international 
political and economic relations are distributed unequally in 
favour of the advanced industrialised rich states. To 
consolidate this point, Blake and Walters (1987.8) write: 
"Even if a poor state does formulate economic policy in 
accordance with classical liberal economic thought, the 
asymmetrical distribution of benefits in its 
international economic relations will condemn it to 
perpetual poverty, foreign penetration and continued 
dependence upon rich states". 
This extract hints at the disharmony between the liberal 
economic position and the radical analysis of international 
political and economic relations. The liberal perspective 
argues that international relations are based on positive-sum 
assumptions whereby a state's involvement in liberal economic 
relations will be to its own, and every other nation's, 
benefit whilst the radical approach argues that mutual 
benefits do not occur and that one state's economic or 
political gain is another's loss. Unlike the nationalist 
approach, the radical perspective does not merely attribute 
this factor to a state's pursuit of its own self interests, 
but to the structure of the international political economy 
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itself, which, according to radical thought, has relegated 
most states of the world subordinate to the interests and 
domination of the advanced industrialised states, such as the 
united states, Britain, Japan and western Europe. 
These three conceptual frameworks have contributed to the 
formation of attitudes pertaining to the world-wide crisis of 
underdevelopment. In other words, based on a different set 
of values and interests, liberal economic theorists attribute 
the causes of underdevelopment to a different set of factors 
than does a radical thinker. Similarly, a person adhering to 
the nationalist perspective ascribes yet another set of 
causes and solutions to underdevelopment and its ensuing 
problems. Before examining each school's analysis of 
underdevelopment, it is necessary to determine which 
perspective - liberal, nationalist or radical best 
characterizes the World Bank's attitude and response to the 
problems caused by underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Blake and Walters (1987.5) write: 
"The classical liberal economic approach is evident in 
the ... basic contemporary foreign economic policy 
orientations of the united States and other governments 
of advanced industrial societies in the West. They are 
evident as well in the policy orientations of key 
international economic institutions such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development [the World Bank)" . 
Thus, the World Bank is committed to the principles of free 
market economics and minimal state intervention. It 
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therefore strongly supports free trade, open markets and the 
principle of comparative advantage as the means of conducting 
international economic transactions and achieving maximum 
economic growth. 
In addition, the extract points to the fact that the united 
states and other advanced industrial nations also approach 
foreign economic policy from the liberal perspective. These 
nations, under the leadership of the united states, created 
the World Bank after the Second World War in 1944. Prior to 
the outbreak of the war, protectionism had dominated 
international economic transactions and the liberal world 
economy of the nineteenth century had collapsed. Based on 
their position as the dominant world power after the war, 
"[t]he Americans worked out a universal system for a new 
world order, one clearly based on traditional liberal 
principles" (Van der Wee:1986.347). 
Thus, the intention at Bretton Woods was to design 
" ... a specific institutional framework which would help 
to realize the building of a new liberal world order and 
guarantee its successful working" (Van der Wee: 
1986.347). 
To this end, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank were created as the institutional pillars of the newly 
created liberal economic order. They were formed to ensure 
that the principles of economic liberalism were adhered to by 
all nation states. Very briefly, GATT was created to ensure 
that liberal trading principles prevailed, whilst the IMF was 
19 . 
designed principally to regulate the financial relations 
between the advanced industrial nations (Onimode:1989 . 20 
Vol 1). 
The following extract from The Economist (12.8.91) summarises 
the rationale behind the creation of the World Bank and 
explains why it has turned to third world development: 
"When the Bretton Woods delegates established the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
'reconstruction' was uppermost in their minds. The 
Bank's first job was to help to finance the rebuilding 
of Europe's economies. As it turned out, the new 
institution was entirely overshadowed in this role by 
the Marshall plan. Soon the Bank turned instead to 
'development', and to the third world". 
This outline characterizes the predominant values and 
interests of the World Bank . It is obvious that the World 
Bank is an institution created by liberally-oriented nation 
states seeking to conduct economic transactions in a world 
where liberal economic principles prevail . This fact not 
only shapes the World Bank's perceptions of the causes of 
Sub-Saharan Africa's crisis, but also influences the manner 
in which it believes the crisis should be confronted. 
There are three perspectives on third world underdevelopment. 
It should be noted that these are derived from the manner in 
which critics perceive the international political economy to 
function. It is important that we are constantly reminded of 
this because it is the basis for analysing the role of the 
World Bank in Sub-Saharan African development strategies. 
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The debate surrounding development and development strategies 
centers on three crucial questions: firstly, why are some 
nations richer than others, secondly, what factors explain 
this division and thirdly, how can it be overcome? The three 
theoretical approaches, economic liberalism, classical 
Marxism, and the underdevelopment position, (all of which 
have their roots in the three theories of international 
political economy) have different answers and solutions to 
these questions. This has given rise to one of the 
most critical problems in the international political 
economy. Gilpin (1987.263) writes: 
"The intense desire of the majority of the human race to 
escape its debilitating poverty and J01n the developed 
world is a determining feature of international 
politics. Yet in the final decades of the twentieth 
century, bitter controversy exists regarding the causes 
of and possible solutions to this problem" . 
The World Bank is one of the major players in this 
controversy and is clearly aligned to the liberal economic 
perspective regarding causes and possible solutions. To 
verify this assertion it is necessary to outline the basic 
premises of the three perspectives. 
The liberal perspective on economic development assumes that 
interdependence and economic linkages between the rich and 
poor states are beneficial to both parties. They claim that 
the most important factor in economic development is the 
efficient organization of the domestic economy and the 
maintenance of a free and competitive economy (Gilpin: 
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1987.265/Frieden & Lake:1987 . 7). To this end, they strongly 
emphasize the need to attract economic transactions arguing 
that: 
"The strategy is to forge national policies in a 
manner designed to exploit the highly sensitive 
international interdependence characterizing the 
contemporary world" (Blake & Walters:1987.172). 
It is evident that this line of thought strongly reflects the 
liberal theory on international political economy which calls 
for free market economics and minimal state intervention 
beyond that of facilitating the dominance of free market 
values. 
Their strategy for economic development thus hinges on a wide 
range of international economic transactions with the 
advanced economies via trade, international aid and foreign 
investment. In order for profitable international economic 
transactions to occur the domestic economy itself must 
function efficiently. In the light of this notion, liberal 
development strategists are of the opinion that ultimately it 
is possible for the less developed regions of the world to 
attain the same standard of living as the advanced 
industrialized states. They use the NIC's, or Newly 
Industrialized Countries, such as Brazil, Hong Kong, South 
Korea and Singapore, as examples of the positive consequences 
of less developed nations opening up markets to attract 
foreign capital and increase exports. The result has been: 
" . .. spectacular 
decades . They 
economic growth 
economic success over the past two 
have achieved higher rates of domestic 
and trade growth than advanced 
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industrial states and other less developed countries" 
(Blake & Walters:1987.173). 
The success of the NICs has given the liberals adequate 
reason to argue that the key to economic development lies in 
the ability of an economy to respond to, and transform itself 
according to changes in the international political economy. 
They believe that domestic social and political problems are 
the reasons behind failed development initiatives, rather 
than the structure of the international political economy. 
Simply translated this means that liberal strategists believe 
that each country is primarily responsible for its own 
economic condition and for changing that policy which is 
malfunctioning. consequently, their primary focus in 
development strategy is on the role of internal factors, such 
as ill-chosen government economic and political policies, 
which they believe are behind inefficient economic markets. 
In other words, development requires minimal state 
intervention and the maximization of economic efficiency 
which can be achieved through open markets and free trade. 
Unlike the liberal perspective which places heavy emphasis on 
the role of internal factors, the classical Marxist and 
dependency positions attribute underdevelopment to external 
factors beyond the control of the individual nation state. 
The classical Marxist perspective is based on Marx's 
interpretation of the evolution of Western civilization. 
Marx believed that capitalism would develop the forces of 
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production and was the natural outcome of primitive commodity 
production and feudalism. It would give way to socialism and 
communism once it had developed the forces of production and 
transformed traditional society into an interdependent world 
economy. According to Marx, the driving force behind each 
stage of production is the class conflict between the owners 
of the means of production and the dispossessed. The pattern 
of economic development would be shaped by capitalism which 
would generate class conflict and would ultimately result in 
the transition to socialism and communism. Marx found, 
however, on turning his attention to the Middle East and 
Asia, that these societies seemed to be devoid of a mechanism 
which would generate social change and came to the conclusion 
that the external force of European imperialism was needed to 
promote development. 
Put very simply, classical Marxist thought argues that 
capitalism generates economic development by: 
" ... destabilizing the status quo ... [and creating] ... a 
set of opposed classes thereby implanting the 
mechanism that will move the society toward economic 
development" (Gilpin: 1987.272). 
This is not to imply that Marx necessarily saw capitalism as 
a positive force. On the contrary, he advocated that 
capitalism, in the process of developing societies, caused 
political conflict because nations rejected and disputed 
their position in the international division of labour. For 
the purposes of this theory's relevance to development 
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perspectives, this amounts to the conflict between the 
advanced industrialized nations and the less developed 
states. 
The underdevelopment position on economic development is 
divided into two perspectives: the structuralist theory and 
the dependency theory. The structuralist perspective 
concentrates on the features of the world economy which 
restrict the prospects for development, such as the poor 
terms of trade for less developed nations' commodity exports, 
whilst dependency theorists emphasize the manner in which the 
economy of a less developed country is controlled by the 
development and expansion of an advanced industrialized 
nation to which it is subjected. 
To simplify, dependency theorists see development in one 
country as being inversely proportional to underdevelopment 
in another. stavrianos (1981.35) aptly summarizes the 
dependency position: 
"Underdevelopment is not a primal or original condition, 
to be outgrown by following the industrialization course 
pioneered by western nations. The latter are 
overdeveloped today to the same degree that the 
peripheral lands are underdeveloped. The states of 
development and underdevelopment are but two sides of 
the same coin". 
This extract highlights the process which dependency 
theorists believe is so integral to underdevelopment in the 
Third World. They do not interpret underdevelopment in terms 
of a dual international political economy whereby the poorly 
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developed states are isolated from and separate to the 
advanced industrialized nations. As stavrianos points out, 
these theorists consider the international political economy 
as a functional integrated whole, whereby certain states 
prosper at the direct expense of others. The advanced 
industrialized nations cannot develop unless they are doing 
so at the expense of the less developed countries. 
The structuralist position, whilst also focusing on the role 
of the international political economy on third world 
underdevelopment, differs from the dependency theorists in 
that it overlooks the process of uneven development and 
emphasizes the structural features of the world economy which 
hinder third world development. The most notable 
structuralist perspective is Immanuel Wallerstein's World 
systems Theory which interprets the world in terms of the 
'core', the 'periphery' and the 'semi-periphery'. The 'core' 
countries are the rich states and the less developed 
countries constitute the 'periphery'. states which cannot be 
as easily categorised, such as South Africa, are termed 
'semi-periphery'. Chase-Dunn and Rubinson (in stiles & 
Akaha:1991.28) write: 
"The main structural feature of this world-system came 
to be [the] division of labour between the emerging core 
areas producing manufactured goods and the emerging 
peripheral areas producing raw materials". 
The creation of this international division, according to 
Wallerstein, dates back to the sixteenth century when the 
Western European countries began to dominate the world 
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economy through trade with Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
Consequently, the structuralist perspective 
division between the core and the periphery in 
international market historically structured 
interprets 
terms of 
to suit 
the 
an 
the 
needs of the core countries which control economic 
transactions and possess large amounts of resources. This 
results in the structural aspects of the world economy, such 
as the bias in terms of trade and protectionism against Third 
World commodity exports, which the structuralists argue 
perpetuate the discrepancies between the core and the 
periphery. Under these circumstances, they contend that the 
peripheral countries will continue to remain underdeveloped 
because the international political economy is biased against 
their efforts. 
It is evident that there is a great deal of controversy as 
regards the origins of underdevelopment. The two main 
perspectives - liberal and radical - provide an insight into 
the many plausible suggestions pertaining to the origins of 
the current twentieth century development crisis. 
strategists shape their solutions to the crisis on the basis 
of what they perceive to be its origins. A simple example; a 
liberal strategist suggests that the underdeveloped country 
opens its market to the international economy whilst a 
structuralist calls for a New International Economic Order. 
This section has sought to create a framework from which 
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development strategies may be evaluated . It has discussed 
and outlined liberal , nationalist and radi cal theories 
applicable to the international political economy and to the 
development crisis. It has argued that solutions to the 
crisis invariably reflect perceived perceptions of its 
origins. It has been suggested that the World Bank derives 
its power from the advanced industrialized nations whose 
rulers created it, and that it reflects their values and 
interests which are best defined by the liberal position on 
the international political economy and development . 
The World Bank approach to the Sub-Saharan crisis can be 
evaluated in terms of this framework . Whilst appreciating 
that every framework has its limitations, it is nevertheless 
a useful means of addressing the dialogue pertaining to the 
issue. These perspectives clearly emphasize the need for 
economic solutions but, apart from the liberal perspective, 
tend to neglect the role played by political and social 
variables. As was discussed in the first section there has, 
, 
however, been a shift in this approach and more emphasis is 
being given to the role which internal political reform can 
play, irrespective of the structure and the processes of the 
international political economy. 
It is in this light that the potency of the World Bank 
approach to reform in Sub-Saharan Africa can, and must, be 
analysed . 
Chapter Three 
THE DEVELOPMENT CRISIS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Life in Africa is characterised by political fragility and 
economic underdevelopment . Having created a series of 
relevant paradigms, it is necessary to use these in order to 
contextualise and discuss the African crisis. This requires 
an identification and analysis of the political, social and 
economic dimensions of the crisis. clearly, there is a need 
to perceive the crisis from two directly opposed points of 
view: firstly, the view which argues 
political economy is to blame and 
that the international 
secondly, that which 
suggests that internal factors pertaining to past and current 
policy errors are the primary cause behind Africa's failed 
development. 
It follows, therefore, that the relevant issue is the extent 
to which the crisis is a consequence of African politics and 
the extent to which it is a consequence of the international 
political economy. Currently, both radicals and liberals, 
and Africans themselves, acknowledge that democracy in Africa 
must be attained . This does not imply that they all see it 
as the ultimate solution to Africa's economic recovery. It 
does imply, however, that in one way or another, Africa's 
poor political record is perceived as an inextricable part of 
its overall crisis . Some critics, like the World Bank 
(1989), believe that the attai nment of democracy will pave 
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the way for economic recovery, whilst others, such as Cheru 
and Green (1989), argue that whilst the installation of 
democratic values is necessary, it is not sufficient to bring 
about the economic recovery of the African continent. 
Both these points of view are relevant to the ensuing 
discussion concerning the political, economic and social 
characteristics of the crisis. As the main issue is whether 
or not political reforms will bring about economic recovery 
it is useful to begin with an outline of Africa's main 
political deficiencies and to follow this analysis with a 
discussion of the economic and social issues. The task that 
follows is to establish the strength of the link between 
these problems and Africa's political weaknesses. Is it as 
strong as the World Bank suggests? or, is the international 
political economy as pervasive and destructive as suggested 
by Onimode (1989)? 
At the recent Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit held 
in June 1991 one of the executive chiefs of the Economic 
commission for Africa, Adebayo Adedeji (in African Markets: 
Sept 1991.3), reflected on 
" ... the now-generally accepted realisation that the 
African crisis is basically political in nature, with 
serious economic and social consequences". 
Interestingly enough, the conference admitted that the 
economic woes of the continent were linked to the lack of 
democratic values in various African countries and one of its 
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major recommendations was that there be: 
" ... limits to the tenure of elected political leaders, 
and a commitment by each African state to the rule of 
law, political pluralism, popular participation in 
governance and the protection of human rights" (ibid). 
As an introduction to Africa's political crisis these 
comments are invaluable. They indicate, above all, that 
Africans are seeking to deal with their many, complicated 
problems and that they believe that this must begin with 
internal political reform. It is no longer acceptable or 
convincing to place the blame entirely on the international 
political economy - Africans have realised that the burden 
is shared. So too has the World Bank : its 1989 report 
entitled 'Sub-Saharan Africa . From Crisis to sustainable 
Growth' notes that: 
"Responsibility for Africa's economic crisis is shared. 
Donor agencies and foreign advisers have been heavily 
involved in past development efforts along with the 
African governments themselves. Governments and donors 
alike must be prepared to change their thinking 
fundamentally in order to revive Africa's fortunes" 
(1989.2) . 
These statements suggest that both parties are more open-
minded than they were previously. Opinions and suggestions 
from both sides indicate that pragmatism and necessity are 
becoming more a part of the crisis than political and 
economic rhetoric. 
Africa's political deficiencies are wide ranging . They 
have been identified in terms of weak democratic values and 
traditions resulting in the prevalence of one party 
autocratic states lacking in civil rights, an excessive 
31. 
degree of political patronage and nepotism, widespread 
corruption, overstaffed and unnecessary bureaucracies - all 
of which have contributed to a general lack of confidence in 
African governments both on the domestic and international 
front . The lack of domestic confidence has led on many 
occasions to coups, as have ethnic and tribal issues. 
Together they have contributed to the widespread show of 
militarism which has compounded the problem of governing 
methods because military dictatorships have channelled 
government funds in the direction of arms and ammunition to 
the detriment of social needs. On the international level, 
the lack of confidence in African governments has negatively 
affected foreign investment. 
These difficulties render the African state ineffectual and 
weak. Most significantly, they have persisted because the 
pervasive lack of democratic values has allowed them to 
flourish, simply because there has been no legitimate way of 
removing the government at fault. More often than not, the 
only means of removing the government has been through 
military means - a fact which accounts for Africa's frequent 
coup d'etats. 
Sandbrook (1985.2) makes a very valid point pertaining to 
this issue when he writes: 
"This deterioration of the state signifies, among other 
things, a diminished capacity to rescue ailing national 
economies when the world economic climate improves". 
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He notes that under current circumstances, even if economic 
conditions improved on a global scale, it is unlikely that 
African governments would be able to solve their economic 
problems . There are two reasons for this: one, there are 
many vested interests at stake - politicians, bureaucrats and 
elite minorities who will seek to hinder any political or 
economic reform which might threaten their current political, 
economic and social affluence and two, government economic 
policy, in many cases, simply does not reflect a sensitivity 
to the diverse needs of economic and social development. 
Political corruption has exacerbated these weaknesses. 
Indeed, corruption in Africa is recognised as one of the 
major political impediments to development initiatives and 
programmes. Claude Ake (1991.40) makes a valid point when he 
notes: 
" . .. the fact that most African leaders have been 
'underdeveloping' the continent for years in spite of 
aid - indeed probably because of it. Between 1980 and 
1988, sub-Saharan Africa received a total aid flow of 
$83 billion, yet during the same period the average 
annual growth rate was minus 2.2 per cent". 
Ake's point is clear - much of the aid received by Africa's 
governments has been siphoned into personal accounts and has 
been used for political expediency. Issues such as this 
highlight why there is an urgent need for political 
accountability . without it, political patronage and nepotism 
will continue to underlie and contribute to corruption in 
Africa . 
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Linked to this is the issue of unnecessary and excessive 
bureaucracy which is frequently cited as one of Africa's 
primary shortcomings. Overstaffed bureaucracies have 
contributed significantly to inefficient administrative 
capacity. The World Bank (1989.55) describes them as 
"woefully weak" and cites a number of good reasons for doing 
so. Broadly put, these reasons focus on issues such as over-
staffing, poorly qualified staff, motivational difficulties 
and the compression of civil service pay scales at the 
expense of higher level staff . The Bank argues that these 
problems have significantly contributed to Africa's poor 
administrative capabilities. There is no reason to doubt 
this argument. As Sandbrook (1985.112) says, this can be 
described simply as "state decay", the result of which has 
been weak and misdirected economic and social policies that 
have compounded and exacerbated Africa's problems. 
In addition to these administrative weaknesses, African 
government, as a whole, has been described as repressive and 
autocratic. until recently, military dictatorships and one-
party states were the norm across the continent. It is 
important to note at this point that whilst this type of 
government does not necessarily mean poor economic 
performance, in Africa's case there does seem to be a direct 
correlation between non-democratic governments and weak 
economic development. 
are frequently cited 
Botswana and 
by the World 
Mauritius, for example, 
Bank as model African 
34. 
countries because they are multi-party democracies with fast 
growing economies . Their success does not, however, suggest 
that democracy is a sufficient condition for economic 
development. What it does suggest is that democracy has 
created an environment which is receptive to development 
initiatives. Decalo (1991.156) clearly summarises this 
point. 
"Democracy is thus perceived as providing a politically 
enabling atmosphere for economic development . The World 
Bank unequivocally posits that a causal relationship 
exists between democracy and sustained growth, arguing 
that it is not mere chance that Africa's top economic 
performers, Botswana and Mauritius, are the only 
countries with true multiparty systems on the 
continent". 
Whilst there is sUbstantial evidence to back such assertions, 
it is important that these evaluations do not become too 
generalized. circumstances differ from country to country as 
do the effects of the international economy. Thus, in some 
countries, even democracy may not provide the means to 
successful economic development. Nevertheless, the Bank is 
justified in its opinion - African government has provided 
critics with a sUbstantial case for attributing the crisis to 
political ineptness. It i s clear that political malfunctions 
have had an effect on Africa's overall economic performance . 
Clearly, given the facts of the political crisis, the values 
and interests of those in power do not appear to have 
reflected an awareness, or understanding, of the type of 
economic and social engineering that development in Africa 
requires. This can be attributed to three reasons: one, 
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many politicians and bureaucrats have benefited substantially 
from the corruption and political patronage, and it is 
therefore not in their interests to change what exists, two, 
those who have wished to change the political system have 
been unable to do so due to the lack of democratic apparatus 
and, three, the administrative capacity of African states is 
weak and unable to cope with demands put upon it by 
development issues. It is worth noting, however, that until 
the waning of the Cold War, the Western powers did little to 
eliminate this problem and often supported corrupt 
governments in the interests of international superpower 
rivalry. Whilst this does not excuse the corruption of 
Africa, it does suggest that there has been a certain amount 
of duplicity on the part of some Western governments. 
This is a broad discussion of the political issues in Africa 
and a good basis for analysing the economic and social 
dimensions of the crisis. Economically, Africa is bankrupt. 
In the words of Decalo (1991.154), the continent has entered 
a "free-fall into economic oblivion". The continent i s 
poverty stricken and the consequences are severe. Barber 
Conable, President of the World Bank up until September 1991, 
summarised the effects that Africa's economic crisis will 
have on the lives of ordinary people: 
"Low-income Africa is the only region of the world where 
the number of people living in poverty would, if current 
trends continue, increase by the year 2000" 
(Cater:1991.22) 
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cater supports this prediction, noting that Africa is the 
only region in the world where population is doubling every 
twenty years and where total debt is greater than economic 
output (ibid). In addition, the continent is suffering the 
effects of environmental degradation and severe drought. 
Combined, these factors have a devastating impact on African 
economies. 
Overall economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has averaged 
only 3.4% a year since 1961. This is only marginally faster 
than the increase in population. The continent's Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) for 1987 was $135 billion - about the 
same as that of Belgium, which has only 10 million 
inhabitants (in comparison to Africa's 450 million) (World 
Bank:1989.16). The Bank acknowledges that experiences do 
vary from country to country, but that there are broad trends 
related to: 
" ... low levels of investment and 
resource use, weak institutional 
resources, and a general decline in 
standards" (World Bank:1989.17). 
saving, inefficient 
capacity and human 
income and living 
In addition to this, per capita incomes are falling and there 
is a shortage of food. African countries are finding it 
increasingly necessary to import food to feed their 
populations. This strains foreign exchange reserves which 
are limited due to poor terms of trade and Africa's weak 
export performance. According to African 
1991.3) : 
"The buying power of African export goods 
between 1980 and 1990, and stiffer 
Markets (Oct 
fell by half 
international 
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competition in these products gave Africa a smaller 
share of the global market". 
This is largely due to the fact that African economies are 
heavily reliant on the export of a few primary commodities 
and minerals for the generation of economic activity. Cheru 
(1989.29) cites some relevant statistics: 
"In 1983, petroleum accounted for all the export 
earnings of Libya, 95% of Nigeria and about 93% of 
Algeria. Copper brought in 83% of Zambia's total export 
earnings and 43% of Zaire's. Coffee provided 89% of 
Burundi's total export earnings and 64% of Ethiopia's. 
Cotton represented 45% of the total value of exports 
from the Sudan and 54% of the value of exports from 
Chad. Cocoa compromised 63% of Ghana's total exports". 
These statistics show why economies which rely on one or two 
commodities are so vUlnerable to changes in the international 
economy. If prices for their primary commodity fall 
overnight they have little else on which to rely. As Cheru 
(ibid) argues, African economies "are dependent on world 
market forces entirely outside [their] control". Put very 
simply, under these conditions foreign exchange resources 
have suffered considerably and African countries have 
struggled to find the foreign exchange necessary to import 
essential inputs and spare parts. This predicament is made 
all the more real by the fact that declines in world prices 
for Africa's export products resulted in a loss of $50 
billion for African countries during the period 1986 and 1990 
(African Markecs:Oct 1991.3). 
Quite clearly, these problems are beyond the control of any 
government, irrespective of its administrative capacity. The 
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effects of the international economy play a large part in 
these issues and there is nothing any African government can 
do to change the terms of trade or the prices of export 
products. In other words, the installation of democratic 
governments will not change the cotton or the copper price. 
But, it stands to reason that an administratively efficient 
and honest government will cope with these problems more than 
one plagued by corruption and ineptitude. 
Africa's debt is largely a consequence of the impact that the 
international economy has had on African economies. Cheru 
(ibid) attributes Africa's debt to declining terms of trade, 
declining official development assistance, OPEC prices hikes 
and the world recession, and growing African military 
spending. Coupled with the effects of severe drought, he 
argues that under these circumstances, African countries have 
little chance of economic recovery, let alone development. 
Compared to the size of its economies, African debt remains 
the highest in the world. By 1990 the continent's debt had 
reached $272 billion which represented more than 90% of the 
area's Gross Domestic Product. In addition, it costs African 
countries more than $20 billion a year to service this debt 
(African Markets:Oct 1991.4). As Cheru (ibid) points out, 
these conditions have been exacerbated by rises in interest 
rates and the appreciation of the American dollar. 
Again, it is worth noting that, for the most part, debt in 
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Africa can be attributed to the negative effects of the 
international economy on African countries. But, as Cheru 
(1991 . 33) notes: 
"African governments are not without blame in the debt 
drama. Many of them suffer from double and triple digit 
inflation, not only because of high interest rates and 
low export earnings, but because they mismanaged their 
economies. Their debt predicament has been aggravated 
by the large appetite many of them have for imported 
military equipment". 
This extract supports those who argue that African political 
and economic mismanagement are principle causes of Africa's 
economic decline. It is important that these issues are not 
overlooked because ultimately, political mismanagement is 
something that African governments can control whereas it is 
unlikely that they will ever be able to control the 
international economy. Excessive military spending is 
obviously a direct manifestation of Africa's political 
shortcomings and hence, it is within Africa's sphere of 
control . The international economy, however, is not . 
Another dimension of the economic crisis relates to Africa ' s 
agricultural performance. On the whole, performances in this 
area have been weak. This is due to the fact that after 
independence, African governments, often under the guidance 
and support of foreign e xperts, were led to believe that 
industrialization was the means of achieving economic growth 
and, to this end, the agricultural sectors were neglected. 
This has resulted in either stagnated or decreased outputs 
and fewer cash crops have been available for export . This is 
40. 
a factor which has contributed to the acute shortage of 
foreign exchange. Most obvious, however, is the fact that 
African agriculture has been unable to keep pace with the 
rise in population with the result that Africa has not been 
able to feed itself and is reliant on food imports (World 
Bank:1989.16) (African Markets:Oct 1991.3). 
Related to agricultural problems is the fact that the 
historical leaning towards industrialization has created an 
urban bias whereby more attention has been paid to the needs 
of the urban population that to those of the rural areas . 
This bias has contributed to the production problems of today 
because it has curbed the incentives for peasants to produce. 
This assertion is best exemplified by the problem of over-
valued currencies. Over-valued exchange rates contribute to 
the urban bias by making food imports cheap for the urban 
population and, simultaneously, discouraging the producers of 
domestically grown crops. The following example from Elliot 
Berg (in Ravenhill:1986.47/8) demonstrates how this can 
occur: 
"If the Ghanaian cedi were 10 to the dollar 
to the dollar, for example, each pound of 
sold for $2 would yield 20 cedis instead of 
cocoa producer could be paid more cedis for 
instead of 2 
cocoa that 
4. The 
his cocoa". 
This overview of Africa's economic predicament indicates that 
the international economy has had grim effects on Africa's 
economic performance. It also notes Africa's own 
contribution to its economic decline. Having discussed the 
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political and economic dimensions of Africa's crisis, it is 
necessary to evaluate the effect that they have had on the 
African population as a whole. This amounts to a discussion 
of Africa's social issues and problems. 
An administratively weak and bankrupt government cannot 
adequately attend to the social needs of its country. Green 
(in Onimode:1989.31) describes Africa's social crisis in 
terms of n ... human deprivation, social misery, mass poverty, 
dislocation, violence and death ... n. These conditions in 
African society are the bottom line of the political and 
economic crisis and, as Green notes, n[t]he radical worsening 
of the position of a majority of Africans is a fact" 
(1989.31) . This statement is borne out by the fact that 
Africa is the only continent where the daily calorie intake 
per person has fallen in the last decade (African Markets: 
Oct 1991.4). 
One of the most worrying long-term dimensions 
crisis facing African countries is that 
population growth. According to African 
1991.4). Africa has the highest population 
the world. Currently, the population is 
approximately 480 million. It is expected 
of the social 
pertaining to 
Markets (Oct 
growth rate in 
estimated at 
to exceed 800 
million by the year 2000. This problem, coupled 
levels of unemployment has significantly contributed 
with high 
to the 
crisis of urbanization which plagues most African countries. 
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Many of Africa's capital cities 
shanty towns which are generally 
squalor. sanitation services in 
are surrounded by large 
a picture of confusion and 
these shanty towns are 
virtually non-existent and cannot cope with the growing 
amount of waste produced by the ever-increasing population. 
Growth rates of urban 
approximately 6% per 
April/May 1990.5) 
populations 
year (Southern 
are increasing by 
African Economist 
At this point, it is relevant to note the method used by the 
united Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to measure and 
evaluate development. The UNDP defines human development as 
" ... a process of enlarging people's choices" (The Economist: 
26.5.90) The choices it deems critical are a long and 
healthy life, education and access to resources. Up until 
recently, it has been customary to evaluate development in 
terms of Gross National Product per head. This approach has, 
however, been challenged by the UNDP's Human Development 
Index (HDI) which dismisses the use of economic indicators 
under the assumption " ... that there is more to life than GNP" 
(The Economist:26.5.90.). To this end, therefore, it has 
published a set of statistics which reflect the quality of 
life in countries based on life expectancy, education and 
access to resources. A sample of the results are illustrated 
in Graph 1 (pg 83). Clearly, in terms of the quality of 
life, Africa is the poorest and most underdeveloped region in 
the world. Even a country like Brazil, which is part of 
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Latin America and has an enormous international debt has a 
higher standard of living than Africa, as does East Germany, 
a country which has recently undergone immense social, 
political and economic upheaval . The graph shows the 
comparison between Africa's success stories, Mauritius and 
Botswana, and the rest of the continent . According to the 
HOI, all other African countries, with the exception of South 
Africa, have a lower standard of living than Kenya. The 
message is clear: in terms of basic social amenities, African 
countries are severely lacking . 
In support of the findings of the HOI, Green (in onimode : 
1989.35) cites some statistics which depict some of 
the harshest consequences of Africa's socially weak political 
and economic policies. He comments on life expectancy and 
mortality in Africa, noting that it is far higher than in 
developed economies and that over 30% of all deaths in Africa 
are under-5's whilst the same figure for industrialized 
nations is 2 . 3%. 
The implications of these statistics are far-reaching and 
frightening. In its 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
World Bank has isolated some of the problems within African 
society which have led to weak social infrastructures 
incapable of coping with rapidly 
unemployment, starvation and death. 
"Previous attempts to achieve 
basic health, education, and 
growing populations, 
The Bank notes: 
universal coverage in 
food security failed, 
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partly because the efforts were swamped 
population growth and partly because public 
was devoted to other priorities" (1989.6). 
by soaring 
expenditure 
It suggests therefore that family planning is the cornerstone 
for improved health care. Similarly, preventive and 
community-based medical care must become more readily 
available as must universal access to clean water a 
prerequisite for better health. It is estimated that 
curative urban hospital care absorbs 60 to 70% of most 
African health budgets whilst rural preventative care only 
receives 10 to 15% of health budgets (Green in onimode: 
1989.36). 
The World Bank (ibid) also notes the need for Africa to have 
a better educated population . 
"School enrollments have been vastly expanded during the 
past three decades, but too often at the expense of 
quality. Improving quality is now the top priority". 
Like health care and family planning, this too will require 
that scarce resources are diverted from one sector of the 
economy to another. Politically, this may prove difficult 
but the long-term consequences will be rewarding. Africa 
needs to improve its literacy. 
Green's statistics, along with the World Bank's suggestions, 
indicate how easily government policy can be misdirected as a 
result of economic and political weaknesses. Governments the 
world over tend to focus policies in politically expedient 
directions, but perhaps African governments have done so at 
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too great an expense. A particular policy can benefi t one 
sector of society to the detriment of another . This is one 
of the central problems of development in that programmes 
invariably favour one sector of a society and threaten 
another . Green writes that: 
" . .. redistributive conclusions might be very radical and 
antagonise some very powerful benefic i aries of the 
present allocation patterns" . (Green in Onimode: 
1989.35). 
Like Goldsworthy (ibid), Green acknowledges that development 
strategies, in the short run, have a tendency to be zero-sum 
in nature and invariably require a trade-off between 
different sectors of a society. The bias towards urban 
curative health care is a clear example of a direct trade-off 
between urban and rural sectors with the political 
implication being that the urban sector provides the base of 
political support for the government. Furthermore, the 
African experience suggests that there is a limited budget 
which cannot meet the most basic needs of all members of the 
society. A consequence of this is that scarce resources, 
understandably, have been channelled in the most politically 
expedient direction. 
These social problems clearly demonstrate how political 
matters have affected policy choices and why governments are 
reluctant to implement strategies which require a radical 
redistribution of resources. Nevertheless, the magnitude of 
death, starvation and poverty in Africa requires that African 
governments make a concerted effort in the direction of 
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social policy. The situation, 
life and death for many African 
as it exists, is a matter of 
people. African governments 
must therefore seek to alleviate these conditions as part of 
their duty to the people for whom they govern. 
Thus far, the political, economic and social dimensions of 
the African crisis have been discussed. There is sufficient 
evidence to link a substantial part of the economic and 
social crisis to the political shortcomings of African 
government. Whilst appreciating that this is a broad 
statement, it does, for the most part, reflect a general 
trend . Nevertheless, despite the clear connection between 
the two, there is no doubt that the international political 
economy has played a large part in Africa's continuing 
economic decline and, that it would be an insular and biased 
approach which ignored this fact. 
African countries, along with the rest of the third world, 
believe, and fervently argue, that conditions will not 
improve until the international economy is reformed and less 
biased against their economies. To this end, they support 
the demands made by Third World nations for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). These demands reflect 
their perception of the evils of the international economy 
and the particular areas which they believe need redressing. 
Galtung (in stiles & Akaha:1991.287) argues that the NIEO is 
a macro approach to the problem of development to the extent 
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that it deals with economic problems at a global level and is 
a blue-print for a new way of ordering the international 
economy. Essentially, the NIEO calls for improved terms of 
trade between the First and Third World, it calls for more 
control by the Third World over the world economic cycle and 
for increased and improved trade between the periphery 
countries themselves (Galtung in stiles & Akaha:1991.287). 
In addition, it 
have the right 
argues 
to form 
commodity prices should 
that less developed countries should 
producer associations and that 
be linked to the prices of 
manufactured exports from developed countries. Furthermore, 
it asserts that they should have the right to nationalize 
foreign enterprises and gain sovereignty over 
natural resources (Gilpin:1987.289). 
their own 
Demands for the NIEO have not been met because the Third 
World does not have the political or economic power to 
enforce its demands. Nevertheless, it is a sound basis for 
analysing and appreciating the effect that the international 
economy has on African economies. It accounts for their 
claim that their economies cannot recover under present 
global economic conditions and indicates why they have argued 
in that past that domestic political issues are secondary to 
the effects of the international economy . 
There is no doubt that international economic conditions have 
played a significant part in African underdevelopment and, 
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that like the liberals, underdevelopment theorists do make a 
valid point. clearly, given two such strong and valid 
arguments it is obvious that both sides have something to 
offer in terms of the quest for causes and solutions to the 
African crisis. The task that currently exists is for 
strategists to take both these perspectives into account when 
formulating development programmes. The most important 
issue, however, in terms of Africa's need for political 
reform, is, as the World Bank (1989 . 2) notes, for the basic 
initiative to come from within Africa. African countries 
cannot hope to cope with the forces of the international 
economy until they have their own political houses in order. 
But, the nature of the international political economy does 
render international support and aid for African countries a 
vital and necessary part of an overall development strategy. 
This discussion provides the springboard from which the World 
Bank's approach to African development can be evaluated. The 
political, economic and social aspects of the crisis have 
been discussed in terms of general trends, highlighting the 
wide range of problems confronting development strategists. 
The discussion has also shown that both liberal and radical 
critics have sound points of view as regards the origins and 
causes of the crisis. This in itself makes development a 
complicated issue in that it must be tackled on two fronts. 
These difficulties must be approached with a sensitivity to 
the political consequences which will inevitably arise, given 
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the nature of current patterns of wealth and power 
distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa. The conflict between 
immediate political expediency and long-term stability and 
growth has been stressed as a severe obstacle to the success 
of development strategies and is thus another factor which 
must be consistently taken into account. 
Having identified the World Bank's approach to development as 
being essentially of a liberal nature, I will now evaluate 
and assess its role in Sub-Saharan African development. 
Chapter Four 
"CRITIC" OR "DONOR"?: THE WORLD BANK AND AFRICA. 
As argued earlier in this paper, the World Bank operates in 
terms of liberal economic ideology. Although it does give 
some acknowledgment to the external origins of the crisis, 
the World Bank believes that Africa's crisis can only be 
alleviated through the implementation of liberal, free market 
economic principles. This has led it into direct political 
conflict with African governments who have, for the most 
part, designed interventionist economic policies akin to 
socialist centrally-planned models. 
The World Bank is extremely critical of Africa's economic 
policies. By logical implication, this means that it is 
critical of Africa's political performance. The Bank's 
dislike for African political and economic domestic policies 
is clearly evident, and it is becoming more evident as time 
passes. Put bluntly, the World Bank has reached the point_ 
where it will not do business with African countries unless 
they show signs of implementing constructive and enduring 
political and economic reform. 
During the 1960's, 1970's and early 1980's development 
priorities were economic. The emphasis was on how the 
economy was performing rather than how the people were 
faring . Recently, however, the focus has changed. This is 
due to two factors: one, the scale of the crisis has reached 
51. 
catastrophic proportions and two, the African continent is no 
longer primarily viewed in strategic, cold war terms. This 
has made a reassessment of policy in Africa necessary and 
possible. 
This 'rethink' developed in the wake of the introduction of 
Gorbachev's 'perestroika' and 'glasnost' reforms in the 
soviet union in the 1980's and the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe. Undemocratic governments, as a result, have 
suffered intensified international criticism. Empirical 
evidence has discredited communism, socialism, Marxism, 
Leninism, totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Today, a 
democratic government operating in a society adhering to free 
market economic principles appears to be the only 
internationally acceptable way of governing. It is a fact 
that African governments are far off this mark. These issues 
have played a significant part in shaping current Bank policy 
in Africa - the result, apart from continued economic 
conditionality, has been the introduction of political 
conditionality. 
This is the current international and ideological context in 
which the World Bank's political and economic reform policies 
for Africa are being shaped. Having established this 
paradigm, it is necessary to discuss the history and reasons 
behind the Bank's involvement in Africa, the political and 
economic nature of its involvement (with particular emphasis 
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on structural Adjustment Loans and policy conditionality) and 
the effect that its involvement has had on African 
government, policy-making and the African population as a 
whole. This will lead to an assessment of the economic and 
political role of the Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
At Bretton Woods the World Bank was created principally to 
facilitate the restructuring of European 
World War II. The role of the International 
(IMF) was to give temporary assistance 
countries after 
Monetary Fund 
to strengthen 
countries with balance of payments problems. At the time, 
neither institution was expected to be dealing primarily with 
the less developed countries, and during the 1950's and 
1960's and up to the early 1970's there was no major overlap 
in the activities of the two institutions (Havnevik:1987.25). 
Third World debt, however, has made their separate roles in 
international economic affairs much less clearly defined. 
The IMF has reacted to this threat to global stability by 
acting, in the words of Loxley, "as policeman of third world 
economic policies" (in Lawrence:1986.97). To this end, it 
has assumed primary responsibility for short-term 
stabilisation and exchange rates whilst the Bank deals mostly 
with medium and longer-term structural reform (The 
Economist:12.8.91). There seems to be a general agreement 
that the IMF dictates economic policy and the Bank follows. 
As Havnevik notes: 
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"The Fund is still largely independent of the Bank, but 
it is not the other way around" (ibid). 
The Bank will not, for example, give a loan to a country 
which lacks a stabilisation programme with the IMF (The 
Economist:12.8.91). To a large extent then, the Bank's 
policies reflect the direction taken by the IMF. 
The long-term aim of World Bank involvement in Africa has 
been to reshape economic policies according to free market 
principles. In the last twenty years this oqjective has 
broadened to include political issues. The result is that the 
Bank now uses economic muscle to facilitate the birth of 
multi-party democratic governments. It sees the attainment 
of both goals as the only sustainable way of solving Africa's 
crisis. Initially, the crisis was perceived as economic, but 
as has been repeatedly stressed, it is increasingly being 
defined as a political crisis with economic and social 
repercussions. The World Bank response to the crisis during 
the past decade reflects this change in attitude and 
emphasis. Its attitude is best exemplified by the nature of 
the loans and policies it has designed over the years for 
economically destitute African countries. 
Initially World Bank involvement in Africa was primarily 
limited to financing projects such as the building of power-
stations and roads. By the 1960's it had diversified 
into farming, education, population and urban development 
(The Economist:12.8.91 . ). In this role, its lending was 
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predominantly to governments, 
owned enterprises. After the 
government agencies and state-
oil price increases of the 
1970's, the Bank, now lending to private businesses too, 
began to pay closer attention to links between government 
policies and the success or failure of individual projects. 
It soon became obvious that a " ... good project in a bad 
economy was likely to be a bad project" (The Economist: 
12.8.91). To counter this problem, the Bank stopped 
financing specific projects and created conditional loans 
whereby cash would be provided in return for promises of 
reform on economic policy. 
The loans pertaining to this kind of lending were of two 
types: Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SECALs) and Structural 
Adjustment Loans (SALs). The former aimed at bringing about 
comprehensive policy and institutional changes within a 
particular sector of the economy whilst the latter contained 
the same provisions but were directed at the economy as a 
whole (Havnevik:1987.13). Thus, in exchange for access to 
international resources, African countries were 
alter their economic policies. As economic 
time largely derived from the government, 
indirect attack on African governing methods. 
The list of conditions clearly reflected 
required to 
policy at the 
this was an 
the Bank's 
philosophy regarding the need for the market to underpin all 
economic activity. They were domestic price liberalisation, 
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import liberalisation, the introduction of export incentive 
schemes, fiscal reform such as devaluation and an auction 
system to determine the exchange rate, increased incentives 
to the private sector and the strengthening of public sector 
institutions (Harrigan & Mosley:1991.73). Any recipient of a 
loan from the World Bank was required to commit itself to 
implementing some, or all, of these reforms . Apart from 
reflecting the Bank's liberal economic outlook, these 
conditions are typical of Western economic ideology and 
indicate the extent to which the Bank represents Western 
economic and political views . 
Conditionality has become an integral part of World Bank 
policy in Africa. Today, the attack on African government is 
less subtle and far more explicit. In addition to the 
economic policy reforms it demands, the Bank demands a series 
of minimal political conditions which must be met in order 
for a country to be eligible for a loan . In addition to 
calling for multi-party democracies, these minimal conditions 
include : 
" .. . ending rampant official corruption; more transparent 
government budgeting; open and competitive bidding for 
large public investment projects; accountability of 
management of state-owned enterprises; and greater 
consistency in the implementation of regulations 
governing investment" (Feinberg:1991.36). 
These conditions, coupled with the economic reforms, reflect 
the Bank's liberal orientation and the fact that the Bank 
analyses Africa's woes in terms of inappropriate government 
policies. In simple terms then, World Bank conditionality: 
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" .. . typically providers] for extensive institutional and 
policy reform with the main focus being on allowing 
world prices a much greater say in the economies of Sub-
Saharan Africa" (Loxley in Lawrence:1986.100). 
Institutional and policy reform in Africa have thus become 
direct concerns of the World Bank. This means that the Bank, 
by virtue of the type of financial lending it has created, 
has stepped beyond the boundaries of a financial institution. 
In effect, it has become one of Africa's most vociferous 
critics and, in so doing, has found an extremely effective 
means of airing its views - and of ensuring that Africans put 
these views into practice. 
The plight of Africa's economies is now so dire that they 
have little choice but to accept the World Bank's terms . 
As Loxley (1990 . 8) writes : 
"It is a measure of the severity of the economic crisis 
that so many African countries should acquiesce in the 
wholesale encroachment on national sovereignty which is 
implied by conditionality" . 
He continues: 
"Yet, this has not been a quiet acquiescence, as 
evidenced by the numerous publicly aired disputes 
between the international institutions and countries as 
diverse in size, economic strength, openness, 
ideological orientation and degree of economic crisis as 
Tanzania, Nigeria, Zambia, Uganda and the Sudan" 
(Loxley:1990.8/9). 
These extracts, in addition to stressing the severity of 
Africa's woes, serve as an introduction to the international 
controversy surrounding conditionality. The controversy 
exists on two levels: firstly, it concerns the direct 
encroachment of national sovereignty and secondly, the 
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appropriateness and effectiveness of the loans and their 
conditions to the African continent. 
As this paper is concerned with whether or not the World Bank 
has a role to play in Sub-Saharan African development beyond 
that of providing economic aid, I will deal specifically with 
the second aspect. clearly, conditionality does encroach on 
national sovereignty but debating the morality and legitimacy 
of this will not solve Africa's problems. It is far more 
relevant to assess the validity of the Bank's conditionality 
programme to the crisis, and the extent to which it has been 
effective. This will make possible an overall assessment of 
its political and economic role 
development process. 
in Sub-Saharan Africa's 
Sub-Saharan African governments are under attack and not 
only from the World Bank . with the demise of the Soviet 
union and its Eastern European satellites, 
floundering ideologically and, consequently, their 
many are 
political 
and economic policies have become increasingly susceptible to 
international and domestic criticism. Governments are under 
constant pressure to initiate long-term reform on the 
political and economic front. Whereas in the past, criticism 
was aimed directly at misdirected economic policies, the 
current trend argues that constructive economic reform cannot 
occur under present undemocratic political conditions. 
'Political accountability' is fast becoming the latest catch-
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word in international and domestic circles. As Cater 
(1991.22) writes: 
"Throughout Africa, there is new thinking and a new 
clamour for democracy, political pluralism, human rights 
observance and accountability of political leaders". 
This new thinking is undoubtedly having some effect. Decalo 
(1991.153) notes that at the time the Berlin Wall fell, 38 
of sub-Saharan Africa's 45 countries were governed by one-
party systems, and that 18 months later, half had committed 
themselves to implementing competitive elections and limiting 
executive powers. According to Esterhuysen (1991.2) it seems 
certain that by the end of 1992, most of the 52 independent 
African countries will have introduced, or re-introduced, 
competitive party politics. 
The issue that arises concerns the extent to which the World 
Bank has contributed to this movement towards democracy. It 
seems that international pressure, in the form of political 
conditionality, has allowed local discontent to express 
itself far more than it has previously. Paul Collier 
(1991.112) suggests that the current democratic mood in 
Africa is the result of a natural societal movement which has 
emerged as the policy errors of the past have become more 
evident and obvious. His premise is that: 
" ... the emergence of a sUbstantial domestic constituency 
which blames economic hardship upon past domestic 
policies is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
sustainable reform of economic policy" (ibid). 
This argument is convincing but it could be argued that this 
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pro-reform domestic constituency has existed for many years 
but has only been able to express itself in the wake of 
international pressure. Thus, it would be more accurate to 
suggest that it is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for economic reform. Nevertheless, Collier is correct in 
arguing that the criterion for assessing the political 
effectiveness of the Bank's programme is " ... whether it 
contributes to the emergence of such a constituency" (ibid) . 
certainly, conditionality has sped up the emergence of a pro-
reform constituency and contributed directly to the current 
change in attitude. It has sustained severe criticism over 
the years, yet it appears that for lack of feasible 
alternatives, African governments are succumbing to local 
pro-reform constituencies and international pressure . As 
time has passed, conditionality has helped politicians and 
the people as a whole see the policy errors of the past. The 
collapse of Eastern Europe has not been the only reason for 
the rise of democratic movements in Africa. According to 
Decalo (1991:154): 
"There was certainly a major spillover-effect, but it 
does not tell the whole story. The continent was ripe 
for a massive populist upheaval, and a number of 
internal and external factors played a role in leading 
the democratic pressures to fruition". 
Like Collier, Decalo interprets the gradual shift to 
democracy in terms of " ... deep societal frustration ... " 
(1991:155). Africa's people have changed over time and 
policy errors are increasingly cited as one of the main 
60. 
causes of Africa's problems. He notes: 
"Populations are no longer reverent of political 
founding fathers, or swayed into politically quietest 
postures by charisma or ideology. They possess much 
larger pools of educated youth ... that are well aware 
of the democratic options available abroad but denied 
them at home by elites with little legitimacy intent on 
ruling forever ... " (1991.155). 
Clearly, Africa's move towards democracy is as much a product 
of local discontent as it is of international criticism. It 
is interesting to note that domestic reformers have begun, 
like the World Bank, to link inadequate institutional 
capacity to Africa's poor development record. Despite the 
controversial nature of the Bank's involvement in Africa, 
therefore, many Afri can governments have succumbed to the 
international and domestic pressure it has induced . This has 
contributed to the domestic commitment to democratic reform . 
In the past, many of Africa's leaders have argued against the 
establishment of democracy in Africa, suggesting that it is 
an alien Western concept, inappropriate in the African 
context. They argued that democracy in Africa would be a 
recipe for ethnic conflict and that it would not provide the 
population with its basic needs (Ake:1991.34/35). Africa's 
dismal development record has, however, cast doubt on these 
arguments . As Ake notes: 
" ... Africa's failed development experience suggests that 
postponing democracy does not promote development; 
during the past decades of authoritarianism, Africa's 
standard of livi ng has been falling steadily and its 
share of world trade and industrial output has been 
declining" (1991.35). 
Whilst this does not mean that democracy will necessarily 
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solve Africa's development crisis, 
World Bank has been justified in 
it does suggest that the 
linking Africa's generally 
its failed development 
doubt that by focusing on the 
weak institutional capacity to 
initiatives. There is little 
need for better government, and by stressing the importance 
of accountability and participation, that the World Bank has 
contributed positively to the democratic debate and movements 
occurring in Africa. 
Thus far; I have argued that conditionality has successfully 
aided the formation of local pro-reform movements which, 
along with international events in the soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, have jolted the African continent into a 
halting democratic transformation . I have suggested that 
conditionality has helped politicians and people realise that 
Africa's current problems are largely a result of past policy 
errors and, that this is the World Bank's most significant 
achi evement in Africa. It has been stressed, however, that 
democracy is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
recovery and to this end it is necessary to critically 
examine the economic effects, as distinct from the political 
effects, of SALs and conditionality. In other words, does 
the trend towards democracy guarantee the successful 
implementation of free market principles and hence, Africa's 
recovery? Experience has shown that free market principles 
cannot exist in non-democratic societies but, in Africa's 
case, does democracy necessarily imply economic recovery? 
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Answers to these questions will go far in providing an all-
encompassing evaluation of structural Adjustment Programmes 
and conditionality in Africa. 
The World Bank has exposed itself to a great deal of 
criticism as a result of its adjustment programmes and 
conditionality. structural Adjustment Programmes, for the 
most part, have been very unpopular amongst Africans because 
they have, due to their contractionary nature, initially 
caused further economic and social hardship. Thus, whilst 
conditionality has contributed to some degree of political 
and institutional transformation, the actual economic 
consequences of the Bank's reforms have been less successful. 
This may, however, be due to the fact that the Bank's 
recommended economic reforms have been implemented in 
unfavourable political environments. 
The World Bank has isolated some of the practical 
difficulties surrounding the implementation of structural 
Adjustment Programmes (de Soto & Orsini:1991.107/8). These 
difficulties highlight the other side of development's 
political nature. In Chapter One I argued that apart from 
the link between political capacity and economic development, 
development itself is political in nature by virtue of the 
fact that it has zero-sum characteristics. In other words, 
programmes aimed at generating development are usually 
detrimental to a certain sector of the population, so that 
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gain in one sector may mean loss in another. Development 
programmes invariably threaten vested interests and political 
conflict can result . 
The first difficulty identified by the Bank is in regard to 
that sector of the population which bears the brunt of the 
hardship which stems from the economic reforms. The Bank 
notes that the poor (which in Africa means the majority of 
people) " ... pay the lion's share in the costs of adjustment" 
(de Soto & Orsini:1991.107/8) and that this makes the 
adjustment measures unpopular and difficult to sustain 
politically . Vested minority interests are another problem 
in that they feel that the reforms threaten their privileged 
access to power. Often, country authorities and technocrats 
disagree with structural adjustment and seek to obstruct its 
implementation. Another problem is that politicians and 
technocrats tend to prefer visible project aid, such as 
building public housing complexes, to structural policy 
reform. Finally, the Bank points out that there is a 
scarcity of competent staff able to carry out the reforms. 
These problems reflect the many complex issues that 
structural Adjustment Programmes have raised in African 
society . Most importantly, they suggest why they have been 
so unpopular and why they have met with such internal 
opposition . Bluntly put, the reforms initially cause severe 
economic hardship, especially for the poor and they threaten 
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Africa's powerful minorities who have thrived under current 
political and economic conditions. 
In the rest of this chapter, I will discuss the economic 
effects of structural adjustment programmes and their 
political consequences. First, an economic definition of 
'adjustment' is required. Essentially, it is: 
" ... a transition from what is perceived as an unviable 
process to a sustainable oneil (Riddell:1987.96). 
More simply, adjustment aid is given to facilitate economic 
change with a view to creating an economic environment which 
will stimulate economic growth without foreign aid. Policy 
and institutional changes are thus central components of 
adjustment. It is with these goals in mind that the World 
Bank has sought to restructure African economies. 
The Bank's policy recommendations stress the need for the 
market to lead the economy. Hence, a typical structural 
adjustment programme (SAP) advocates devaluation of the local 
currency, movement to an auction system for exchange rate 
determination, increases in domestic currency prices for 
exports, reduced budget deficits, price liberalisation, 
increased incentives to the private sector and employment and 
wage reductions in the public sector (Loxley:1990.10). 
The Bank maintains that implementation of these measures 
will, in the long term, create an economic environment 
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conducive to sustainable and equitable development. The 
rationale behind each policy is geared towards shifting the 
economy away from dependence on foreign imports, hence 
reducing balance-of-payments deficits, and encouraging local 
production, particularly in the agricultural sector, which 
has suffered in the past due to a variety of factors, such as 
overvalued currencies, which have made imports cheap. In the 
words of the Bank itself: 
"A devaluation raises the price of imports, which 
switches demand from imports to local goods. Exchange 
rate adjustments are a simpler and more effective way to 
promote domestic production than tariffs or other trade 
restrictions" (World Bank:1989.47). 
Hence, by devaluing the currency the Bank intends that 
con?umption shifts away from exports, which drain scarce 
foreign exchange reserves, to local goods. The intention is 
that this will stimulate internal production, agriculturally 
and industrially, and generate employment. 
Put simply then, SAPs are geared towards the promotion of 
domestic production and reducing dependence on exports. It 
is argued that this type of economic strategy, implemented in 
a democratic environment, will stimulate local economic 
growth and encourage foreign investment which, in its turn, 
will incite further domestic growth. In the long term, this 
will make African economies more competitive in world 
markets. 
In practice, however, the theory has not seemed as sensible. 
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Many critics seem to agree that SAPs have been implemented in 
inappropriate environments and have thus been dismal economic 
failures . The Bank's position in response, however, is that 
the strategy of adjustment with growth has helped African 
countries to begin to improve their economic performance. 
Before examining these opposing points of view it should be 
stressed that although both sides claim evidence to support 
their assertions, it is probably too soon to assess the long-
term economic implications of these programmes. My views are 
thus offered primarily on the basis of short-term effects . 
When assessing the effectiveness of SAPs, one of the most 
important issues is that of methodology. Lawrence and Seddon 
(1990.5) raise several relevant questions pertaining to 
analyses surrounding SAPs . 
"Is it possible to estimate how the countries adopting 
SAPs would have done if they had not adopted? Do we 
have a control group of non-adopter countries with 
similar characteristics to the adopters with which 
direct performance comparisons can be made? Would 
adopters have carried out SAPs anyway, even without an 
agreement with the World Bank and the IMF? How are 
strong and weak adopters to be defined? Does acceptance 
of strong conditionality mean its implementation?" 
These questions are raised in response to the Bank's public 
announcements concerning the effectiveness of its programmes. 
It maintains that strong adopters of SAPs are faring better 
than weak ones (ibid). critics such as Cheru (1989), Loxley 
(1990), Marshall (1990) and Parfitt (1990), along with the 
united Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), besides 
questioning the methodology behind such assertions, are less 
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enthusiastic about the consequences of SAPs, arguing that 
they have applied identical remedies, irrespective of a 
country's circumstances, that the SAPs have harmed the poor 
and that they have ignored the views of governments of 
developing countries. Most significantly, they argue that 
SAPs have failed to generate the promised economic growth 
and, in some instances, have contributed to and exacerbated 
political and economic instability. 
This controversy has been ignited by statements published by 
the World Bank arguing that: 
" ... when the performance of reforming countries is 
compared with that of non-reforming countries, there is 
evidence that the combination of reforms and added 
assistance has led to higher agricultural growth, faster 
export growth, stronger GDP growth, and larger 
investment - this, despite the less favourable terms of 
trade facing the reforming countries" {World BankjUNDP: 
1989.3}. 
critics have attacked this statement and its implication that 
SAPs are achieving the desired results. They argue, in 
accordance with the questions raised by Lawrence and Seddon 
that there is not enough counter factual evidence to make this 
type of assessment and that its statistics are based on 
dubious methodology. 
Loxley {1990}, for example, notes that the impact of SAPs 
differs from country to country depending on their economic 
structure prior to the adoption of a SAP. Basing his study 
on Ghana and Zambia, he concludes that in the short run 
Ghana, which many supporters of SAPs see as the success story 
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of World Bank and IMF policies, could have been e xpected to 
perform better than Zambia, whose economic structure makes 
short-term gains from SAPs impossible. He further notes that 
Ghana's apparent success is unlikely to be reproduced in 
other African countries and that there is no guarantee that 
the current trend is sustainable . In other words, he is 
arguing that SAPs have different effects on different 
economies and that it is incorrect to suggest that what works 
in one country will thereby work in another . 
Loxley's point is valid. He is not suggesting that SAPs are 
totally inappropriate to African countries; he is merely 
noting that it is inappropriate to apply the same remedy to 
each country and that the success of one country cannot be 
used to justify SAPs as a whole. 
Marshall's paper on SAP in Mozambique (1990) indicates that 
whilst the programme has registered some measure of economic 
success, (in terms of growth in gross domestic product), the 
social costs have been extremely high . This has occurred as 
a result of the deregulation of the economy which is the 
central feature of SAP . Most goods are now sold without 
control prices and subsidies on food prices have been 
removed. This ended accessible prices for domestic staple 
foods. Graph 2 (pg 84) illustrates the increases which 
occurred between March and April 1988. Marshall summarises 
the effect that these reforms have had on the average person: 
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"with the higher prices, many urban workers can no 
longer purchase the quota available per family . The 
consumer co-op network which had been part of the 
rationing distribution system finds itself in a cash 
flow crisis, without enough money to purchas e the 
quantities of goods from the wholesalers to which their 
members are entitled through the rations systems. In 
Maputo, staples like macaroni which formerly had no 
shelf life now grow stale in the shops, not for lack of 
hunger but for lack of buying power . .. " (1990.32). 
Even two wage hikes of 50 and 15% have failed to cushion the 
price increases which are a direct result of SAP . These 
difficulties are exacerbated by Mozambique's civil war and in 
the rural areas where RENAMO is active, the priorities have 
been day-to-day survival rather than 'getting the prices 
right' (1990 . 34). Consequently, agricultural production has 
not increased in accordance with World Bank/IMF predictions. 
As Marshall notes, their predictions are based on the 
assumption that African peasantries are: 
" ... ready to increase production rapidly just through 
the incentives of prices and consumer goods" (1990 . 35). 
She accurately points out that this is not the case because 
of extraneous factors such as war, drought and the fact that 
historically the peasantry has been marginalised. 
It is clear that country- specific factors alter the effects 
of SAPs. SAPs do not take such factors as war and drought 
into account. Furthermore, in some cases the Bank may have 
over-estimated the productive capacities of the African 
peasantry. In some instances, it seems that economic 
predictions may have been thwarted by social realities and 
that Bank analyses are not always relevant in the African 
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context. This has contributed to the high social costs of 
SAPs and made them difficult to sustain politically. 
But, in support of the economic rationale behind SAPs, The 
Economist (12.8.91) makes a noteworthy point regarding their 
effects on the rural, as opposed to the urban, poor . It 
notes that whereas adjustment is likely to affect some of the 
urban dwellers, it will not necessarily affect the rural 
poor . For example, currency devaluation will not reduce 
their spending power because, unlike townspeople, they do not 
buy imports, and higher farm prices will make most people who 
work the land better off. Thus, the negative social effects 
of SAPs may not be as widespread as some critics suggest. 
Research undertaken by Harrigan and Mosley (1991) indicates 
that the strongest beneficial effects of SAPs have been on 
balance-of-payments current accounts. This has occurred via 
the stimulation of exports and the curbing of imports. Their 
research suggests that there is a negative correlation 
between SAPs and investment and that GOP growth rates have 
been disappointing. Cheru (1989.40) has reached similar 
conclusions, noting that: 
"Although some African countries have improved their 
short-term trade and balance-of-payments positions, few 
have shown an increase in any of the indicators that 
measure real, sustainable development . Rather, most 
have slid backward amidst grow1ng inequality, 
environmental degradation, deindustrialization and 
poverty" . 
These criticisms suggest that SAPs may fare well in some 
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sectors of an economy but that overall, they have not 
generated the predicted results . It may, however, be too 
soon to tell, and as Harrigan and Mosely have observed: 
"Given that the Bank's reforms '" are primarily 
intended to stimulate the su~ply side of the recipient's 
economy, one would expect beneficial results to become 
apparent only in the medium to long-term" (1990.73). 
Hence, it is likely that in the short term the economic 
decline which motivated the country to apply for a SAP will 
continue. To a certain extent, this accounts for their 
initial poor performance. But, after Harrigan and Mosley 
adjusted their time periods in order to account for medium-
term performance, their results continued to reflect that 
SAPs have had a disappointing impact on GDP growth rates and 
that there was still a strong negative correlation between 
SAPs and investment (1990.91). Balance-of-payment positions, 
however, continued to show positive results. 
They describe their results as "disappointing" and conclude 
by suggesting that the adverse investment effects will most 
likely have a negative effect on GDP growth. In addition, 
they note that these results must be added to : 
" ... the weight of the evidence now accumulating which 
indicates strong adverse effects of adjustment as a 
whole on distributional and social welfare indicators" 
(1991.91) . 
The combined opinions of Harrigan and Mosley, Cheru, Loxley 
and Marshall reduce the impact of the Bank's enthusiastic 
announcements. Whilst it seems that SAPs have had positive 
effects in some areas, these benefits are overshadowed by 
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the fact that from the average citizen's point of view, the 
rising cost of living has made life more difficult than it 
was previously. This has had severe implications for 
Africa's already precarious political foundations and has 
almost certainly contributed to the current widespread 
discontent. Many of the average people are unaware of the 
existence of SAPs and governments are thus forced to bear the 
full brunt of criticism. 
A recent edition of African Business (Dec 1991), focusing on 
the effects of structural adjustment in Zimbabwe, notes that 
SAPs have not been properly introduced into many African 
countries and that most people simply do not understand why 
subsidies on food or price controls have been removed. This 
has done little to stem the rising tide of social discontent: 
"Opposition comes from workers as inflation bites into 
their incomes and mortgages rise, as well as from civil 
servants who face retrenchment as part of an exercise to 
cut state-sector costs" (ibid) . 
It may well be that many governments have deliberately not 
informed their electorate of what the SAP entails so that the 
World Bank can be used, when necessary, as a scapegoat. For 
some governments, it would be political suicide to admit to 
supporting externally-imposed policies with such severe 
social consequences. Some SAPs, therefore, have been 
implemented in countries where the popUlation is unaware of 
both the economic rationale behind the reforms and of the 
heavy short-term consequences they will pay in return for 
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long-term improvements. In the long run, this 'strategy' has 
increased opposition to the government and intensified calls 
for democracy and political accountability. 
Africa's grievances regarding SAPs have been documented by 
the ECA. The document basically asserts that SAP is 
associated with weak or negative growth and that the 
"draconian changes" required have had severe adverse affects 
on the living standards of ordinary people and such 
vulnerable groups as woman and children. The Bank's response 
to these accusations has been to note that SAPs "have been 
adapted to mitigate their social costs" (Parfitt:1990.131). 
It also acknowledges that when a country starts implementing 
a SAP from a high degree of distortion that the process must 
be managed more carefully with regard to timing, pace and 
scope to avoid disruption (1990.140). It does not, however, 
change its overall attitude to development in Africa and 
continues to emphasize that SAPs must be continued, albeit in 
a "more nuanced and sustainable manner" (ibid). Underlying 
much of the criticism is the fundamental belief on the part 
of many critics that SAPs are not appropriate to the 
circumstances of African countries as they fail to address 
the root causes of underdevelopment and unequal exchange 
(Cheru: 1989.38). It is also argued that SAPs favour the 
advanced countries because of their tendency to: 
" ... put heavy emphasis on export promotion to increase 
export-earnings to pay debt rather than reorienting 
African economies toward production for domestic 
consumption and the utilization of local resources to 
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achieve self-reliance" (Cheru:1989.39). 
These issues suggest that on a broader scale, SAPs can also 
be analysed in terms of an overall strategy on the part of 
the West to create an economic climate conducive to the 
values of international capital. 
This discussion has indicated that SAPs have not been 
unqualified success stories. They have met with widespread 
resistance due to the initial short-term effects they have on 
the economy in which they are implemented. The Bank's claim 
that reforming countries have fared better than non-reforming 
countries has been refuted by critics who argue that 
improvements in the balance-of-payments position have not 
contributed to overall improvements in the general standard 
of living and that, if anything, SAPs have had a considerably 
negative impact on the lives of the average African citizen, 
particularly the urban poor. 
This implies that, economically, 
their worth. There is little 
SAPs have still to prove 
evidence to suggest that 
African countries who have adopted SAPs are really in the 
midst of transforming from an 
economic condition. The World 
economic reform cannot occur 
environments. This reasoning 
unviable to a 
Bank's argument 
in politically 
sustainable 
is that 
unfavourable 
can be used as a partial 
explanation for the non-performance of SAPs but it seems, 
given the economic impact of adjustment, that the creation of 
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democratic environments will not guarantee economic recovery. 
Democratic environments will benefit SAPs to the extent that 
governments will be more accountable to the people and thus 
should be more disposed towards cUltivating a politically 
receptive environment. A democratic government will more 
likely be receptive to criticism and opposition and will 
allow healthy public debate on adjustment. Reform is more 
likely to be sustainable within an environment where the 
government shows itself to be fully committed to the 
adjustment process and seeks to explain to the electorate the 
reasons for implementing such changes. It is also more 
likely to occur where the government is prepared to 
acknowledge that past economic policies have played a 
significant part in distorting the economy. 
Thus, whilst democratic governments 
countries with environments more 
may provide 
receptive to 
African 
economic 
adjustment, they will not guarantee a smooth or easy economic 
recovery. This may, in the long-term, provide the World 
Bank with a pressing need to restructure and re-evaluate its 
approach to development in Africa. It may well find that the 
buck only stops with the structure of the global economy. 
structural adjustment and conditionality have had significant 
effects on the African crisis. From an economic perspective, 
the structural adjustment of African economies has been met 
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with mixed reactions with some critics suggesting that it is 
too soon to evaluate their performance. others have argued, 
with much justification, that the "draconian" measures have 
meant that the poor have borne the brunt of adjustment and 
are suffering more than previously. Some critics have noted 
that the effects of SAP vary from country to country and that 
it is therefore inappropriate to think of adjustment as an 
all-encompassing solution to the African crisis. Moreover, 
whilst the democratization of Africa is a welcome and much-
needed occurrence it is not a sufficient criterion for 
economic recovery. There is no doubt that there is a 
pressing need for economic reform in African countries and 
that adjustment in some sectors is required, but given some 
of the social side-effects of SAPs, it is cle?r that Africa 
needs 'adjustment with a more human face'. 
On the political front, 
productive. I have argued 
conditionality has been 
that it has contributed 
more 
to the 
formation of domestic constituencies calling for democratic 
reform and that to date this is the World Bank's greatest 
achievement in Africa. Conditionality has correctly 
identified many of Africa's past policy errors and 
contributed to a more open-minded approach to development on 
the part of many Africans. There is no doubt, as many 
Africans have admitted, that African government is in urgent 
need of reform. Conditionality, in the form of international 
pressure, has provided an impetus for political and economic 
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reform. Whereas strategies fully honed to the appropriate 
needs of African development have yet to be discovered, 
conditionality has created an environment which accepts that 
the need to reform is great. 
Having discussed the nature of the World Bank's involvement 
in African development, I will 
the long-term implications of 
conclude with a discussion of 
the Bank's involvement in 
African development. Particular emphasis will be placed on 
Africa's future prospects under World Bank conditionality and 
structural adjustment. 
Chapter Five 
SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
At the outset of this study I anticipated a conclusion that 
the installation of democratic governments would be a 
sufficient condition for Africa's economic recovery. I now 
understand that I had overlooked or underestimated the 
factors relating to the international economy with regard to 
My view now is that, in Africa. the development process 
although the installation of democratic governments would be 
a positive step forward for Africa, democratization can only 
ever be part of an overall solution to the African crisis. 
I began by arguing that development is an intrinsically 
political concept because of its zero-sum characteristics. I 
also noted that development strategists, such as the World 
Bank, pay attention to the political environment in which 
economic strategies are implemented. The available evidence 
suggests that there is a correlation between stable 
government and the capacity 
prosperity . This correlation, 
liberal economic outlook and 
for economic 
along with the 
the changed 
recovery and 
World Bank's 
international 
environment, has increased its tendency to link economic 
recovery with political stability. 
Through the economic and political conditions attached to its 
loans, the World Bank seeks to bring about a restructuring of 
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African societies, economically and politically. It argues 
that its economic adjustment programmes, if implemented in 
democratic societies, will enable African countries to adjust 
to and benefit from its relationship to the international 
economy. Perhaps contrary to its expectations, there is no 
hard evidence to support this assertion. Instead, the 
available evidence suggests that a country with a multi-party 
democratic political system is more likely to respond to the 
need for economic reform and to cope with the difficulties 
surrounding adjustment. It does not suggest that democratic 
governments will necessarily be economically prosperous. 
The Bank's economic structural adjustment programmes have 
been criticized because of their harsh effects on the poor, 
and on vulnerable groups such as women and children . 
contrary to the Bank's p~edictions, countries which have 
adopted SAPs have not shown signs of significant economic 
recovery. Whilst some countries have improved their balance-
of-payments position due to the export-oriented nature of 
SAPs, the general rule appears to be that countries which 
have followed adjustment programmes have continued to show 
weak economic growth and have 
external investment . 
experienced a decline in 
Ironically, the Bank has had more success in the 
sphere. Through political conditionality, it 
pressure on African governments to reform their 
political 
has put 
political 
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systems and become more accountable . I have argued that 
without this pressure, Africa's halting democratic 
transformation may not have occurred . Democracy will have a 
positive impact on Africa . It will improve the continent's 
human rights record and it will provide an environment more 
receptive to economic adjustment and recovery. Governments 
will become more accountable to their people and less likely 
to indulge in corrupt behaviour. 
Political improvement in the form of democracy is therefore a 
condition for economic recovery in Africa . The World Bank 
has correctly identified and responded to this reality. But, 
the evidence suggests that Africa will not recover unless 
there is some degree of economic reform in the international 
economy. On its own, even an administratively capable 
government can do little or nothing to change the terms of 
trade or the prices of export products. Yet, the prospects 
for the reform of the global economy seem even less likely 
than economic recovery in Africa. Put simply, the world's 
most powerful and dominant economic powers the united 
states, the European Economic Community and Japan - favour 
the status quo because it works for them. The global economy 
reflects their values and interests; their economies benefit 
from its current structure. They 
not wish to, make crucial concessions 
patterns benefit them as they do. 
cannot afford to, and do 
when current trading 
81 . 
Thus, though political reform in Africa countries will 
improve matters, it is only part of an overall solution . 
International economic reform is also a necessary condition 
for Africa's economic recovery. Economic recovery in Africa 
depends on both criteria . SAPs and conditionality only deal 
with political reform and domestic economic recovery. They 
do not attempt to affect the problems caused by the structure 
of the global economy. 
Hence, with the likelihood of reform in the international 
economy being sl i ght, any chance of economic improvement in 
Africa now depends on its ability to respond to the calls for 
domestic political stability and accountability . This will 
increase its capacity to deal with the complex issues 
surrounding its fragile economic position . In addition, 
African countries must improve their economic bargaining 
strength through more inter-regional and inter-Third World 
trade. 
The World Bank plays a role in Africa beyond that of a 
conventional donor agency. Its involvement has had a direct 
effect on Africa's political systems an area which 
transcends the everyday business of an economic institution. 
Economically, its impact has been less successful with some 
critics arguing that SAPs have worsened Africa's weak 
economic position. This suggests that the liberal economic 
values and interests of the World Bank are not necessarily 
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appropriate to African countries because of the continent's 
fragile position in the global economy. 
Development is a zero-sum game. Africa's recovery is 
dependent on concessions from the international community and 
from African leaders and elites. In order to improve the 
quality of the average African's life, these sectors must be 
prepared to compromise their values and interests. The World 
Bank, in its capacity as a critic, has identified this need 
at the domestic level, but has failed to respond to the need 
for international compromise. This could well explain the 
failure of its economic programmes. 
The democratization of the African continent is therefore 
only part of the solution. A new global economic order is 
also a vital component. As yet, the World Bank is only 
showing signs of being willing to deal with the former, not 
promote the latter. 
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